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Introduction 1
In May 2011, a member of the jihadi website Shumukh al-Islam initiated a survey designed to identify the "main reason that made you [i.e., the online group's members] love jihad." Some of the available answers listed included: "Family member," "Internet," "a friend" or "one of the Sheikhs." Of the eighty-seven Shumukh members who responded, ten of them credited Khattab, the subject of this biography, and the Arab jihad against the Russians in the Caucasus as the reason behind their commitment to jihad. Khattab's influence ranked second to religious upbringing in the survey, credited by eighteen members as their main motivation to love jihad. It is remarkable that Khattab's influence is ranked ahead of Usama bin Ladin's, credited by six members to have caused them to take up jihad. 2 Khattab's role in and influence on the jihadi landscape is not limited to online members of jihadi websites. The jihadi intellectual 1 The author would like to thank one anonymous reviewer, whose insight into the project was very helpful. In addition, the author would like to acknowledge the especially dedicated effort of Dr. Nelly Lahoud on this project. Beyond just editing the piece, she offered valuable insights and assistance in making this piece what it is. 2 The member writes under the name "Abdooo6." See "Istitla` Muhimm: Ma huwa Awwal Sabab Ja`alaka Tuhibbu al-Jihad?," Shabakat Shumukh al-Islam, https://shamikh1.info/vb/showthread.php?t=109641, accessed on 14 May 2014. The survey is ongoing; the period covered in this study is between May 2011 and May 2014. During that period, the influence of a friend was ranked third (nine members) and the attacks of 9/11 ranked fourth (eight members). In May 2014, the total number of Shumukh members was 9,464. Unless otherwise stated, translation of Arabic sources are by Muhammad al-'Ubaydi.
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Mustafa Hamid remarks in one of his books that Khattab's jihadi project was, in the 1990s, comparable to if not more ambitious than that of Bin Ladin's. 3 Who, then, was Khattab , and what was his contribution to the jihadi enterprise? As this biography reveals, Khattab was an international jihadist par excellence. He was born in Saudi Arabia and took up jihad first in Afghanistan, then in Tajikistan and Dagestan, and finally in Chechnya, where he devoted most of his political and militant energy and where he died. In the mid-1990s, he became the leader of the Arab Ansar in Chechnya, and he had his own resources and funds. 4 His charismatic leadership enabled him to recruit not just Arab fighters but also Muslims of other nationalities, including Tajiks, Afghans and Uzbeks, who joined his group in Chechnya to fight against the Russians.
He was keen to understand the culture of the places in which he fought, especially that 3 Mustafa Hamid [a.k.a Mustafa Abu al-Walid], Tajikistan, no date. In this book, written by Hamid as part of a series called Tharthara Fawqa Saqf al-`Alam, Abu al-Walid mentions that he knew Khattab personally, and that he met him for the first time in Afghanistan. Abu al-Walid traveled to Afghanistan in 1979, where he met Jalaluddin Haqqani and fought alongside him until, as Hamid puts it, "the liberation of Gardez," Afghnisatn on April 1992. He had a good relationship with the other leaders of the jihad in Afghanistan, such as Yunis Khalis, Mawlawi Nasrullah Mansur and `Abdallah `Azzam. Although Abu al-Walid has never joined al-Qa`ida, he had a good relationship with its previous leader, Usama bin Ladin, and the current one, Ayman al-Zawahiri. In early 1993, Abu al-Walid supervised the training of jihadis of the Islamic Renaissance Party of Tajikistan (IRPT) of Abdullo Nuri (also known by the name Hezb-e-Nehzad in Tajik). He was among the first Arabs to pledge allegiance to Mullah Muhammad `Umar in 1997. At the time of this writing, Abu al-Walid resides in his native homeland, Egypt. He has written over twenty books and many articles, and he has conducted a number of interviews with various jihadist figures over his career, mostly documenting the history of the Afghan jihad against the Russians. See http://www.mustafahamed.com/?page_id=2 4 Mustafa Hamid, Tajikistan.
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of Chechnya, and beside his mother tongue, he learned to speak Russian, English, Farsi, Chechen and Kurdish. 5 Khattab is believed to have pioneered the use of jihadist media, especially the production of videos calling for jihad. (1969) (1970) (1971) (1972) (1973) (1974) (1975) (1976) (1977) (1978) (1979) (1980) (1981) (1982) (1983) (1984) (1985) (1986) (1987) (1988) , then moves to his time in Afghanistan (1988 Afghanistan ( -1994 and Tajikistan (1994 Tajikistan ( -1995 , and then discusses his time spent in his final destination, Chechnya (1995 Chechnya ( -2002 Like most Saudis, Khattab was raised in a religious family. 11 His father was born in alAhsa' province and moved to the city of `Ar`ar in the northern part of Saudi Arabia.
Khattab's father used to take his two young sons with him on hunting trips and wanted to raise them to be strong and brave. He died two years before the death of Khattab. 12 Khattab's mother, Rasmiya al-Muhtadi, was born in Syria and was of Turkish descent, as her father had emigrated from Turkey after the fall of the Ottoman Empire. 13 Khattab 10 Russian non-jihadi sources would obviously paint Khattab differently. 11 The Media Wing of Kata'ib al-Nur, al-Thamar al-Mustatab fi Sirat al-Qa'id Khattab, no date, www.saaid.net/Doat/hamad/khattab.pdf. While all primary sources tell us that Khattab was born in Saudi Arabia, some secondary sources suggest that he was born in Jordan to a tribe living near the border with Saudi Arabia. For example, see "Obituary: Chechen Rebel Khattab," BBC News, 26 April 2002, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/1952053.stm. Furthermore, some secondary sources refer to him as an ethnic Chechen from the Arabian Peninsula; however, his family denied all these rumors in a letter sent to media outlets including al-Sharq al-Awsat, confirming that Khattab was born in `Ar`ar, Saudi Arabia, and that he was a descendent of a family that used to live in Najd, Saudi Arabia. See "al-Jaysh al-Rusi: Qatalna Shamil Basayiv wa-lakin lam Na'thur 'ala Juththatihi ba'd," al-Sharq al-Awsat, 1 May 2002, http://classic.aawsat.com/details.asp?article=101021&issueno=8555#.VEAWOVcy08A. 12 "al-Jaysh al-Rusi," al-Sharq al-Awsat. 13 Ibid.
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was particularly fond of his mother, and he clearly agonized over his yearning to see his family and his commitment to global jihad that necessitated being away from them. It seems that his mother did not hide her longing to see her son and continuously pleaded with him to return home. In a short message Khattab addressed to Muslims "around the Globe," he highlighted this agony, and no doubt that of many fellow jihadis, but he also sought to stress that commitment to jihad should take priority over the love of family:
The biggest obstacle that stands between us and jihad is family. We have carried out jihad without the approval of our families. If we obey [their instructions] and return to our homelands, who would carry on this burden and continue alda`wa. Every time I talk to my mother on the phone, she asks me: "when will you return home my son?" But if I return to be with my mother, whom I haven't seen for more than 12 years, who would continue [the journey] that we have started? 14 Khattab seems to have had a good relationship with his brother; upon hearing the news of his death, his brother, Abu 'Umar, could not control his pain. He later described the pain he suffered as stemming from not just losing "my dearest brother" but also of losing someone whom he considered to be his "leader." When he went to share the news with his mother that same day, he relates, "When I saw her, I couldn't hold myself together, and I cried loudly." 15 Khattab studied in `Ar`ar until the third grade, and he continued his education in the city of al-Khubar, in Saudi Arabia's eastern region, where his family moved. Khattab had ambitions to pursue his tertiary education abroad, and he must have been a promising student given that he was selected by ARAMCO, a Saudi national oil and natural gas company, to complete its College Preparatory Program (CPC). According to the company's website, the CPC is a highly selective program "designed to prepare select high school graduates for admission to and success at competitive universities In the late 1990s, following the famous airport operation in Jalalabad, Afghanistan, Khattab formed his own group, separate from that of Bin Ladin's, who was at that time the "general commander of Arab forces there." 21 Khattab was able to gather a number of Saudi youths from the different camps around him and create his own company, called "Khattab Company," or as he liked to call it, the "Artillery Company in Jalalabad," with "brother Abu Ayyub al-`Iraqi" as his deputy. 22 He was able to fund his company from his own resources. According to Mustafa Hamid, "the period was the darkest period in the history of Jalalabad, as a number of horrible disagreements, arguments, and acquisitions took place between various companies there." 
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Khattab criticized the role of Arabs in the Afghan jihad, who he believed were dependent on Afghans for almost everything, including medical treatment for injuries.
Based on what he witnessed, he claims that Arab fighters tended to receive inadequate military training before proceeding to the battlefield, whereas Afghans limited their fighting to simple shooting from a specified position. 26 Khattab, however, acknowledged the role played by Arabs in some battles, remarking that "they did great in Jaji when the Russians attacked the biggest and most important mujahidin's route in southern Afghanistan and in Kandahar." 27 In essence, Khattab criticized the Arabs' experience in Afghanistan for not connecting theory with practice when it came to translating da`wa (religious educational efforts) into carrying out jihad. Although he acknowledged that Arabs "established institutions, universities, and major efforts were achieved with regard to Da`wa," he did not believe that these yielded results on the jihadist front. He derisively remarked, "What was the fate of the [Afghan] student who studied four years [in these institutions]? He worked as a cook in a guest house, went to a Gulf [state] to learn Arabic language or become a merchant." In his view, the founders of such institutions "should have finished the efforts that they started. They built a project that is based on a firm foundation, so finish 26 Ibid. 27 Ibid. your work, and give your students weapons and ammunition. These to cross the river back and forth each time they wanted to carry out an operation against Soviet troops in Tajikistan. 32 Crossing the river by using fleet of speed boats that Khattab owned wasn't the only obstacle that faced the group.
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He relates that they could use vehicles only up to a certain point, following which "we had to continue the journey mounting donkeys for three to four days."
34
If this was not enough, after they crossed the river, they had to endure the hardship of climbing "mountains and mountains the likes of which my eyes had never seen." 35 Khattab was keen to be as little a burden on his fellow Tajik jihadis as possible. He spent four months acquiring the basic needs of his group, using his own resources, including the purchase of "weapons, communication devices and other logistics." His only request from the Tajik was the need for "mujahidin from those whom you know or can recommend so that we can train and even equip them with everything. After we prepare these people militarily, we will fight battles alongside them." 
20
We struck another convoy in Serjenyurt during one of the most difficult times when Russian forces were leading a massive offensive on the mountains. We destroyed 47 out of 100 of their vehicles, and we gained a lot of bootie from them . . . Two weeks later, we attacked a convoy of 32 vehicles, four tanks, 11 armored vehicles, four tankers and the rest were trucks. They were all crushed from the first to the last one, only 12 soldiers, who were in the last vehicle, survived and escaped through the river.
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Judging by the nature of his involvement in Chechnya, one may speculate that had his own version of the story. He mentions that his plan was to mount a quick attack against this base using 100 elite mujahidin special forces, take over the warehouse in which Russian tanks were stored (it contained sixty T72 and T80 tanks, and around three hundred other vehicles) and then take over the entire camp which contained, according to Khattab, more than five thousand Russian soldiers. His ultimate plan was to capture not only the tanks but also the Russian soldiers, whom Khattab planned to take back to Chechnya and use to force the Russian government to make concessions in return for their freedom. Only the first part of the operation was successful: Khattab's men were able to take over the warehouse and the tanks in it; however, because of "a lack of good intelligence," they found that the tanks were without batteries or fuel. They ended up destroying the tanks before they withdrew from the scene. 71
A Tour in Dagestan
According to Khattab, Russia maintained a "strict economic embargo" 72 after the withdrawal of its troops from Chechnya, and it kept a clandestine intelligence machine operating in the country. Khattab claims that "we caught 37 intelligence agents who 70 Ibid. It is difficult to buy original landmines in the Republic of Chechnya, but the mujahidin have succeeded in constructing anti-personnel mines. These were tested and indeed they were found to be excellent and even better than the original ones. 80 Khattab's many effective operations against the Russian forces led the Russian government to make the killing of Khattab and other leaders of jihad in Chechnya a priority. Khattab's sources informed him that the Russian government gave Nikolai Partrishov, the director of the FSB, the Russian security service, a deadline of four months to capture the leaders of the shura council.
81
The Russians mounted a massive campaign against the jihadists in the mountains and, in one battle, they came close to 
31
with them. When he had to, he used to deal with them far from his original location. 83 It seems that the two men were patient and persisted in their plan; with time, they built trust and displayed their utility, "as they knew the best route to transfer money, equipments and letters" to Khattab's group from outside Chechnya. When the day came, according to al-Ghamidi, they dipped one of the Arabic language letters, which was sent to Khattab by one of the brothers from the one of the surrounding countries, in a deadly poison.
They gave it, along it with other letters and items to Khattab's personal guards, and told them of the existence of very important letters that should be delivered to Khattab as quickly as possible. Khattab opened the letter and started reading it while he was eating; a few minutes later he felt dizzy and nauseous and went to bed. When he woke up for the morning prayer, he could barely breath, and soon 
